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olitical questions and refugee P problems are inseparable. How 
should humanitarian organizations 
assisting refugees deal with the political 
questions? There are at least three 
approaches. 
One approach assumes that since 
refugees are a by-product of politics, a 
refugee problem cannot be adequately 
addressed unless its political causes are 
confronted. This conviction charac- 
terizes the work of increasing numbers 
of - non-governmental organizations. 
The other two approaches give 
immediate humanitarian issues priority 
and adopt an outwardly neutral stance 
toward political issues. Both United 
Nations bodies assisting refugees, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA), adopt this stance. The 
difference between the second and third 
approaches - as exemplified by UNHCR 
and UNRWA - hinges on the issue of 
resettlement. 
UNHCR provides temporary relief 
while pursuing the objective of finding 
permanent homes for the refugees as 
soon as possible - through repatriation, 
settlement in the country of first asylum 
or resettlement abroad. UNHCR refuses 
to get into the political rights and 
wrongs of a refugee issue, but 
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nonetheless affects the political 
equation indirectly. To the extent that 
Salvadorans, Chileans, Southeast 
Asians, Afghans, Lebanese, Ugandan 
Asians, Czechs, Hungarians, East 
Germans, Jews and other post World 
War I1 refugees are permanently settled 
rather than left in camps, an explosive 
reminder of the source of each refugee 
problem is removed. When masses of 
discontented and readily radicalized 
refugees are dispersed, a weakening in 
the moral outrage at the causes of their 
displacement follows. 
Resettled ethnic groups have always 
been divided on the degree to which 
they ought to attempt to right historical 
injustice. Many simply want to get on 
with the job of reconstructing their lives 
in their new homelands. Estonians, for 
example, may gather together to 
remember and protest the elimination of 
their nation's State, but the protest 
grows weaker and weaker as the 
children become Canadianized or 
Americanized. 
The third approach, exemplified by 
UNRWA, attempts to completely 
separate humanitarian and political 
quest ions. '  UNRWA was f i rs t  
established to provide temporary relief 
for Palestinian refugees. In contrast to 
UNHCR, it was not mandated to pursue 
resettlement. UNRWA developed on the 
assumption that the three solutions of 
repatriation, permanent settlement in 
countries of f i rst  asylum and 
resettlement abroad were not viable 
options: "It was soon recognized that 
few if any would be allowed to return to 
their homes at an early date, that 
countries in the area were economically 
incapable of absorbing hundreds of 
thousands of refugees and that the 
refugees themselves feared they might 
' "Political aspects of the Palestine refugee problem. 
as well as the question of repatriation and 
compensation, are the responsibility of United 
Nations bodies other than UNRWA." UNRWA: A 
survey of United Nations assistance to Palestine 
refugees, p. 1. 
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forfeit the~r claim to return if they 
somehow managed to  establish 
themselves on a permanent b a s i ~ . " ~  The 
political issues were ostensibly left up to 
the refugees themselves, while UNRWA 
became a quasi welfare state in charge 
of the health, welfare and education of 
the refugees. 
What are the consequences of this 
third approach? What are the effects of 
allowing the political objectives of 
refugees to be determined by the 
refugees themselves while humanitar- 
ianism becomes the responsibility of an 
outside agency? 
ince political questions and refugee S problems are inseparable, any 
attempt to assist refugees must have 
some political consequences and be 
based on some political premises. One 
effect, therefore, of attempting to 
separate humanitarianism from politics 
is that the political premises become 
unquest ioned assumptions. For 
example, the Palestinians assisted by 
UNRWA are by definition Palestinian 
Arabs. The Palestinian Jews who fled 
Nablus, other settlements in what is now 
the West Bank and the Jewish Quarter in 
Jerusalem were not classified as 
refugees. Nor were the Jews who left 
UNRWA "Fact Sheet" No. 9. 
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Thus the historical past is distorted 
Humanitarian options for the future 
are cut off as well. For example, one 
assumption made by UNRWA was that 
countries in the area were economically 
incapable of absorbing hundreds of 
thousands of refugees.3 History has 
proven this false. All of the Palestinian 
refugees could have been resettled in 
Middle East countries just as over a 
million Jewish refugees from Arab 
countries were absorbed and resettled 
in Israel. In fact, most Palestinian 
refugees have been resettled in these 
countries. Almost 40% of the refugees 
live in a prosperous and thriving Jordan. 
Another 37.5% who fled the West Bank 
and Gaza when it was occupied and 
subsequently annexed by Jordan have 
been absorbed into the economy of 
Israel since Israel occupied those areas. 
Al though the Palest inian Arabs 
understandably chafe and protest 
against Israeli administration and 
occupation, there is almost full 
employment in the area and the terrible 
conditions of the refugee camps are 
gradually being replaced by new 
housing developments. Of the over 12% 
of the refugees in Lebanon, many do 
continue to be a political problem, in 
part because they did not settle into a 
viable economic life. But, in general, the 
historical facts of the wealth of the 
United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, 
Libya, etc., where many Palestiniansare 
employed, prove overwhelmingly that 
UNRWA's premise that the area was 
economically incapable of absorbing 
hundreds of thousands of refugees was 
false. 
UNRWA could not pursue humanitar- 
ian options of resettlement in countries 
of first asylum or in third countries 
because of a political obligation 
restricting its activities: the refugees' 
right to resettle at some date in the 
homes from which they fled, or to 
receive compensation if they chose not 
to do so. 
The pure humanitarianism thus 
becomes politicized to a degree. Rights 
logically ascribe wrongs, when those 
rights are not permitted to be actualized. 
If it is assumed that the refugees have a 
right to return and they do not return, 
then the countries from which they fled 
must be judged guilty for preventing 
their return. Humanitarian agencies, 
ostensib ly neutra l  on  po l i t i ca l  
questions, cannot help pointing out this 
corollary to the rights issue, for it creates 
a critical boundary condition for their 
activities. Thus, not only does UNRWA 
blame one party; it attributes the need 
for its continued existence to the failure 
of that same party: "Failure to implement 
the United Nations Resolutions that 
might have facilitated a solution has 
perpetuated the need for UNRWA's 
Ibid. 
services to the refugeesw4 Further, 
UNRWA claims that "failure to maintain 
UNRWA's services could be harmful to 
the achievement of a just and lasting 
peace in the Middle Eastw5 The goal of a 
refugee relief organization - refugee 
relief - has become tied to a political goal - 
peace. Whether the peace is just or not 
depends on one's political views. 
The most serious consequence of 
attempting to pursue pure humanitar- 
ianism is that the humanitarian agency 
becomes part of the no-solution 
outlook. If resettlement in other 
countries is ruled out as aviablesolution 
by one party, and return to the country 
of origin is ruled out by the other, then 
no solution is possible. UNRWA is 
destined not only to play its role in a 
non-solution, but  to  effectively 
perpetuate premises which inhibit a 
solution. 
Viable solutions are eliminated 
because humanitarianism is separated 
from politics in a way which allows 
polit ics to dictate the boundary 
condit ions for  humanitarianism. 
Particular political rights are taken as 
prior to universal rights. The right of a 
refugee to return is not a universal right; 
it is a political demand. Refugees do 
have universal rights - the right to a 
home where they can live free of the fear 
of persecution and where they can 
prov ide fo r  themselves. When 
humanitarian agencies base their efforts 
on universal rights they diffuse political 
issues. When humanitarian agencies 
base their mandates on political rights, 
the result is a severe limitation on the 
possibility of solving the refugee 
problem and an exacerbation of the 
political issues. 
UNRWA, through its attempt at pure 
humani tar ianism, is  thorough ly  
politicized in its assumptions, its goals, 
its perceptions and its view of the 
necessity for its own role. If its moral 
purity is somewhat sullied, its welfare 
role is even more questionable. 
T hree factors determine eligibility for the services provided by UNRWA. 
First, the refugees must be registered as 
being "persons or descendants of 
persons whose normal residence was 
Palestine for a minimum of two years 
preceding the Arab-Israeli conflict in 
1948 and who, as aresult of that conflict, 
lost both their homes and their 
livelihood." Second, the refugees must 
be in need. Third, they must have taken 
refuge in areas adjacent to 1948 Israel. 
' UNRWA: A survey of United Nations assistance to 
Palestine refugees. p. 2. 
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Source: UNRWA, June 30, 1981 
In 1979 there were 1,803,564 refugees 
registered. In 1952, there had been 
approximately 1,000,OO~. In  1949 
UNRWA provided a figure of 726,000 
refugees. 
Was the original figure correct? Even 
if it was, how did it grow by almost 250% 
in 30 years? 
Emil Ghory, the Secretary of the 
Palestine Arab Higher Committee, 
estimated that there -*ere 300,000 
Palestinian refugees in July of 1948 
following the second truce. Other 
Palestinians left after that date because 
they did not want to live in Israel. (They 
did not lose their homes and livelihood 
because of the conflict; they lost them 
because they did not like the results of 
the conflict. Nevertheless they were 
registered as refugees with UNRWA.) 
Even the addition of these later 
refugees does not create a total of 
726,000 Palestinian refugees in 1949. 
There was a maximum of 1,200,000 
Arabs resident in Palestine in 1947=, of 
which 450,000 to 550,000 were not 
displaced or left in Israel. Hence, 
displacement could have totaled 
726,000 equal to the total number of 
refugees UNRWA claims to have 
registered. But 160,000 Palestinian 
Arabs remained in their homes or were 
allowed to return to their homes in 
Israel.' 40,000 emigrated to distant 
countries. 70,000 settled in the countries 
of first asylum but did not register. The 
maximum number of Palestinian 
refugees must have been under500,000. 
Where does the discrepancy of 
226,000 between this figure and 
UNRWA's figure come from? Whether 
pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian sources 
are cited, it seems that the original 
number of registered refugees was 
grossly exaggerated by counting 
Palestinians resident in Jordan whom 
UNRWA registered as refugees, 
enabling them to get ration cards. 
The original number of refugees was 
exaggerated. What about the increase? 
The Palestinians have a very high birth 
rate. In the West Bank in the period 
1972-1975, for which there are accurate 
statistics, the birth rateaveragedslightly 
under 45 births per thousand and the 
'Cf. Terence Prittee. "Middle East Refugees" in The 
Palestinian. Transaction Press, New Jersey, 194.5. 
A study very sympathetic to Palestinian 
nationalism estimates 650,000 refugees. Cf. The 
Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, William Quandt, 
Fuad Jabba, Ann Mosely Lesch. University of 
California Press. Berkeley. USA. 1973. p. 48. Cf. also 
Don Peretz. "The Palestine Arab Refugee Problem," 
in P.Y. Hamoud and Sidney S. Alexander, eds.. 
Political Dynamics in the Middle East, New York: 
American Elsevier, 1972. 
mortality rate around 16 perthousand. If 
losses due to fighting and net migration 
are assumed to be minimal, the 
population could not have grown by 
more than 3% per year. And this 
presumes a lower mortality rate than 
would have been likely in the period 
1948-1 952, considering the conditions 
in the camps. 
Perhaps it doesn't matter that the 
number of refugees is grossly 
exaggerated. Not all registered refugees 
are eligible for aid: only those in need. In 
1979, 46% of the 1,803,564 registered 
refugees received basic rations. At the 
time, 37.5% of the refugees lived on the 
West Bank in Gaza where unemploy- 
ment was almost nil; and 40% of the 
refugees were registered in Jordan 
which was b 0 ~ i n g  with virtually full 
employment as well. 
The original number of refugees was 
exaggerated. The level of growth was 
exaggerated. 44% of the refugees 
received rations although almost 80% 
lived in areas of full employment. And 
yet the Commisioner-General of 
UNRWA, Olof Rydbach, argues that in 
1980 over 600,000 refugees over and 
above the 800,000 refugees already 
receiving rations were really entitled to 
rations. Unfortunately, UNRWA was 
unable to provide them "because a limit 
was placed on the number of recipients 
several years ago."8 
I recall visiting the Gaza Strip in 1977. 
At one major intersection in the Gaza 
refugee camp, I met a vendor selling 
flour, rice, oil and sugar. The bags of 
'UNRWA 1981, p. 13. 
flour and rice were clearly marked 
"UNRWA". I asked, through an 
interpreter, why he was selling UNRWA 
rations. He told us he had bought 140 
ration cards. Evidently they are sold like 
taxi licenses in many cities, and the price 
fluctuates according to estimates of 
their futurevalue; that is, estimatesof for 
how long and in what quantities they 
would entitle the holder to receive free 
UNRWA rations. (Currently the annual 
basic ration per card in the Gaza Strip is 
60 kilos of flour, 4 kilos of rice, 4.5 kilos 
of oil and 2.4 kilos of sugar.) 
U NRWA claims that it is on the brink of collapse from lack of money. It 
claims that its collapse would lead to 
"disaster for the Palestinian refugee 
community, for the host governments 
and for the peace and stability of the 
Near East reg i~n . "~  The only disaster for 
the Palestinian refugee community 
would be for the entrepreneurs and 
commodity traders who deal in UNRWA 
ration cards. 
Nor would there be disaster for the 
host countries. Israel and Jordan would 
merely have to assume their full 
financial responsibilities for all their 
inhabitants who participate in their 
economies. 60% of the UNRWA budget 
goes to education. Why should the 
international community subsidize the 
Israeli and Jordanian governments 
which clearly could support the 
education and welfare needs of the 
refugees? 
And as for UNRWA's collapse being a 
disaster for the peace and stability in the 
Near East - there is no peace and 
O Ibid, p. 6. 
stability in the Near East. To the extent 
that some measure of progress was 
achieved through the Camp David 
agreements between Israel and Egypt, 
UNRWA had no relevant role. 
When thirteen million refugees are in 
need of assistance, one needn't look far 
for better uses for the funds that support 
UNRWA. They could be used to helpthe 
refugees produced by the recent Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon. 
Two years ago, UNRWA's annual 
budget was $238 million per year, to 
which Canada was pledged to  
contribute $3.6 million in cash and $4.5 
million in flour. Now the budget is 
almost $300 million. 
UNRWA is a costly lesson in how 
humanitarian organizations assisting 
refugees should deal with political 
questions. 
Do immigrant women have adequate access to  language training in Canada? 
What services is a refugee entitled to  if he is sponsored to Canada by his family? 
Should special employment services be provided for immigrants? 
"WE'LL ANSWER THAT QUESTION WHEN OUR STUDY IS COMPLETED . . ." 
A major review of Canada's policies and programs for settlement and integration of newcomers into Canadian society is 
now complete. The review has been a joint undertaking of the three federal departments involved in settlement: 
Employment and Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Secretary of State. The three ministers plan to establish a 
position on the key policy and program issues raised in the report and make a joint submission to Cabinet. According to 
Mr. Axworthy the next stage will be consultation with the provincial governments and the private sector, probably in the 
autumn of 1982. 
Sponsorship and Settlement 
TRENDS IN IMMIGRATION 
Have changes in settlement services 
in Canada kept in step with changes in 
Canadian immigration ' patterns in 
recent years? Gordon Kaufman, 
Executive Director of the Toronto 
Region of Jewish Immigrant Aid 
Services of Canada, noted at a recent 
meeting on sponsorship and settlement 
services that whereas at one time 
occupational skills and experience 
immigration selection, now family 
reunification is probably the most 
important consideration. This, together 
with the provisions for refugees in the 
new lmmigration Act that took effect in 
1978, means that most immigration to 
Canada now involves some form of 
sponsorship - from family members, 
from a private group or agency, or from 
the federal government itself. 
provided the main criteria for 
YEAR 
1 966 
1967 
1 968 
1 969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
TRENDS IN CANADIAN IMMIGRATION, 1966-1980 
TOTAL 
1 94,743 
222,876 
183,974 
161,531 
147.713 
121,900 
122,006 
184.200 
218.465 
187,881 
1 49,429 
114.914 
86,313 
11 2,096 
143,117 
SPONSORED 
ASSISTED 
RELATIVES 
% 
19.1 
24.2 
23.8 
24.1 
25.2 
24.0 
24.3 
24.3 
21.8 
22.7 
19.9 
10.2 
9.4 
Source: Canada Employment and Immigration Commission 
Language Training and Settlement 
TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY 
A major aspect of the settlement 
review concerns language training for 
newcomers. Teaching English as a 
Second Language Across Canada 
(TESL Canada) has presented to the 
federal departments conducting the 
review a position paper on ESL for 
newcomers subtitled Six Principles 
Toward a National Policy. TESL Canada 
hopes to see its six principles embodied 
in any new policy: 
universal accessibility to ESL for all 
newcomers; 
greater flexibility and sufficiency of 
programs; 
national, provincial and local 
coordination; 
functional Canadian orientation and 
citizenship content in ESL material; 
increased support for community 
agencies providing settlement services; 
recognition of the key roles of the ESL 
professional and the ESL profession. 
TESL Canada has also proposed a 
spec i f ic  model  f o r  newcomer 
integration based on two stages: 
Stage I: a full-time three-month 
reception ESL program called Welcome 
to Canada, available to all newcomers; 
Stage 11: referral to a more flexible range 
of Manpower-sponsored options, 
including "English in the Workplace" 
programs. 
